Tag: Organizational Culture

  • Deep Work Is a Social Contract

    Deep Work Is a Social Contract

    Years ago, I tried working the way all the productivity books told me to work.

    I configured Outlook to check my email only twice a day. I opened Slack only a few times. Everyone I worked with knew that if something was genuinely urgent, they could call or text me.

    Almost no one did.

    The system worked. I could concentrate. I was able to stay with difficult work for longer than a few minutes at a time.

    My boss told me explicitly that I seemed aloof.

    And I was punished for it.

    I was ostracized. People spoke badly about me when I was not around. I was put on a performance improvement plan despite delivering exceptional results. I was responsible for more revenue and more revenue growth than either of the other two people with my job title, yet I was paid 25 percent less.

    The organization benefited from the results while penalizing the way of working that helped produce them. The habits that made me more productive also made me less integrated into the team. I eventually hated working there. I spent two and a half years trying to make it work. The day they put me on the PIP, I quit. That was one step too far.

    At the time, I thought I had solved the problem: control the notifications and protect the calendar. I had solved the mechanical part. I had not accounted for what my availability meant to everyone else.

    That is why so many people can follow all the productivity advice and still be unable to do meaningful work. Focus is governed by the people around us.

    You can block your calendar and turn off every notification. If the people around you treat unavailability as a problem, you still do not have permission to focus.

    We usually treat concentration as a matter of personal discipline. Turn off notifications. Block your calendar. Put your phone in another room. Learn to say no. Wake up earlier. Find the right application, routine, or method.

    Those practices can help. They do not change what happens when your manager changes your priorities, a colleague treats every message as urgent, a client expects an immediate answer, or your team interprets delayed responsiveness as a lack of commitment.

    We experience distraction individually, so we assume we should fix it individually.

    In most workplaces, though, the people around us help create distraction and enforce the expectations that keep it going.

    Productivity is social

    Shawn Vanderhoven came to a similar conclusion through a three-year study of leaders and teams. In my conversation with him for The Unfolding Thought Podcast, he explained that he and his collaborators began by asking a straightforward question: what prevents people from doing their best work?

    A consistent answer was that people could not get deep. They were asked to switch tasks continually. Priorities kept changing. The people around them, often without intending to, made sustained attention nearly impossible.

    Vanderhoven and his team then studied leaders from 150 companies who appeared to create the opposite conditions. In Pause: How to Lead Brilliant Work in a Busy World, he reports that teams led by people who deliberately pause spend three times as much time on their largest projects.

    Pause: How to Lead Brilliant Work in a Busy World by Shawn Vanderhoven with Anne Vanderhoven
    Pause: How to Lead Brilliant Work in a Busy World, by Shawn Vanderhoven with Anne Vanderhoven.

    The important word is led.

    Vanderhoven is not saying that individuals have no responsibility for their attention. In our conversation, he acknowledged that unusually disciplined people can create a substantial amount of focus even in distracting environments. The problem is that they often pay for it socially. They are described as detached, unresponsive, inflexible, or difficult.

    That describes what happened to me. My system protected my concentration, but it did nothing to protect my standing with the group.

    Work depends on other people. We need information, decisions, cooperation, and trust. We also want our managers and colleagues to see that we are contributing. Once a group treats immediate availability as evidence of cooperation, focus starts to look like withdrawal. That becomes especially problematic in a remote environment, where managers cannot see you sitting at your desk, attending meetings, having conversations, or look over your shoulder to see what you are working on. They might read your apparent disconnection as you being out mowing the lawn or getting groceries while they are paying you to work.

    The problem is not imaginary. Sophie Leroy’s research on attention residue found that when people switch away from unfinished work, part of their attention remains with the original task. They might have moved to the next meeting or message physically, but not cognitively. Research on collaboration overload has also shown how structures intended to increase cooperation can slow decisions, overwork employees, and place especially heavy demands on high performers.

    Microsoft’s 2025 examination of workplace activity describes what this looks like at scale. Its telemetry showed a workday crowded with email, messages, meetings, and app switching. In the accompanying survey of 31,000 knowledge workers across 31 markets, 48 percent of employees and 52 percent of leaders said their work felt chaotic and fragmented. The widely repeated figure of 275 daily interruptions applies to the most heavily pinged 20 percent of users, so it should not be mistaken for the experience of every employee. Even with that qualification, the larger pattern is hard to miss: many companies have made near-continuous access to coworkers feel normal. Microsoft calls it the infinite workday.

    The problem is not personal

    If distraction were primarily an individual failure, personal productivity advice would be enough. We could teach people to manage their notifications and calendars, then hold them accountable for concentrating.

    But a notification is only the final delivery mechanism. Someone decided to send the message. Someone created the expectation that it should receive a quick response. Someone scheduled the meeting, added another priority, or delegated a task without discussing what it would replace.

    Vanderhoven calls the trail of distraction a leader leaves behind a digital wake. A manager might be highly focused on an important outcome while remaining unaware that each new request is fragmenting the attention of several other people. The manager experiences momentum. The team experiences interruption.

    This can happen even when every request is reasonable. In fact, that might be the harder problem we have to solve.

    Stephen Covey’s familiar illustration of priorities used a jar, large rocks, and pebbles. Put the large rocks in first, then allow the pebbles to fill the remaining space. Vanderhoven argues that the modern workplace has outgrown the illustration. The problem is no longer too many pebbles. We have more large rocks than the jar can hold.

    Most of the opportunities in front of us might be genuinely worthwhile. The proposed campaign could work. The product improvement could matter. The client request is legitimate. The new AI initiative might eventually be essential. We still cannot do all of them well at the same time.

    Once the jar contains more large rocks than it can hold, calling all of them priorities stops being useful. Someone has to decide what will not get done.

    That decision belongs to leadership because employees cannot resolve conflicting organizational commitments on their own. If a manager announces three priorities while leaving ten existing obligations untouched, the team does not have three priorities. It has thirteen pieces of work and an additional burden: deciding which promises it is safe to break.

    One of the practices Vanderhoven describes is exposing this hidden workload. After leaders identify the work that supposedly matters most, they ask people to put everything else they are still expected to do on the table. Only then can the group decide what to stop, shrink, postpone, or reassign.

    Until the hidden work is visible, a new priority is simply another demand. Putting everything on the table reveals what the organization is actually committed to doing.

    Deep work is not isolation

    If distraction is social, it can be tempting to solve it by reducing the number of people, conversations, and interruptions around us. I understand the impulse. It is essentially what I tried years ago. The problem is that too much isolation carries its own cost.

    In my earlier episode of The Unfolding Thought Podcast with Neel Doshi, he told me about an engineer who realized he had not spoken with anyone at work in four days. That might sound like an extraordinary opportunity for deep work. It could also produce loneliness, detachment, and the sense that the work is no longer connected to anything larger than the task itself.

    Shawn made a useful distinction in our conversation: struggle can come from too much connection or too little. A person in meetings all day might be unable to think. A person working almost entirely alone might spend just as much cognitive energy wondering whether anyone sees the work, whether it matters, and whether they still belong.

    A randomized experiment by Ethan Bernstein, Jesse Shore, and David Lazer helps explain why neither extreme works. The researchers compared groups with constant interaction, no interaction, and intermittent interaction. Constant interaction raised the average quality of solutions but made it less likely that a group would discover the best one. Isolation encouraged exploration but produced less consistent performance. Groups that interacted intermittently got the benefits of both. They could learn from one another without losing the independent exploration that led to better solutions.

    What I take from that study is that good work needs a rhythm. We need time when nobody else can get at the problem through us, and we need regular points at which other people can challenge what we are seeing. Either extreme makes failure more likely.

    A workable social contract defines when access is actually necessary and when concentration will be protected. It does not require everyone to disappear.

    AI creates capacity

    Imagine two similar companies adopting the same AI tools. One uses them to remove administrative work and return time to research, judgment, and thought. The other turns every saved hour into more assignments and expects every employee to cover more ground. Both can report a productivity gain, but they are building very different kinds of companies.

    Shawn described this. AI makes it possible for him to take on work outside his normal expertise. The output might look good enough, particularly when he does not know the field well enough to recognize what is missing. When AI works in an area he understands deeply, however, he can see the distance between a plausible draft and excellent work.

    AI can produce an answer. The harder question is whether the user knows enough to judge what it produced, another thing Neel Doshi and I touched on in our podcast discussion.

    The research so far gives us good reason to take that problem seriously. A field experiment involving 758 Boston Consulting Group consultants found substantial improvements in speed and quality for tasks within the capabilities of the AI system used in the study. For a task outside that capability frontier, however, consultants using AI performed worse. The researchers call this the jagged technological frontier: two tasks that appear similarly difficult to a person might fall on opposite sides of what AI can do reliably.

    This does not mean the productivity gains are imaginary. In a study of 5,179 customer-support agents, access to a generative AI assistant increased issues resolved per hour by about 14 percent on average. The largest improvements went to less experienced and lower-performing workers, while the most experienced workers saw little benefit. The results suggest that AI can spread effective practices, but they also show why it is misleading to speak of a single universal productivity effect.

    A 2025 study of 319 knowledge workers adds another caution. Higher confidence in generative AI was associated with less self-reported critical-thinking effort, while greater confidence in one’s own ability was associated with more. This was a survey, not a causal experiment, so it does not prove that AI weakens thought. It does suggest that the way people understand their own responsibility changes when a confident machine enters the workflow.

    Leaders can easily misread all of this. If AI reduces the time needed to produce an artifact, they might conclude that people need less time for the work. But production is only one part of knowledge work. Someone still has to choose the problem, define what good looks like, examine the result, notice what is absent, understand the consequences, and take responsibility for the decision.

    Better tools can increase the need for thought because they give us many more possibilities to evaluate. A cheap draft is useful only if someone still knows how to decide whether it is good.

    When AI saves five hours, the important management decision comes next: will those hours improve the work, or will they simply be filled with more work?

    Who owns the time AI saves?

    Suppose an AI tool saves an employee five hours each week.

    What happens next?

    Does the employee spend some of that time investigating a harder question, improving the work, learning something new, or talking with the people affected by it? Or does the organization immediately add five hours of additional assignments?

    I think most companies will not answer explicitly. The calendar will answer for them. Once people can produce drafts and analyses faster, managers will ask for more of them. A person who can monitor three agents will be asked to monitor ten. The saved time disappears because there is always another worthwhile thing the company could do. It gets replaced by more volume, not more quality.

    You can see the sensitivity to that tradeoff in the reaction to apparent “AI slop.” Someone comments on a social media post and gets told it must have been written by AI, even when it was not. This has happened to me. The person is reacting to the feeling that you are pushing quantity ahead of quality.

    This is how AI could accelerate a company into having almost no deep work at all. It will not need to distract people in the familiar way. It can remove individual tasks while increasing the number of active projects, decisions, reviews, and conversations competing for attention.

    Microsoft’s infinite-workday report makes the same danger unusually explicit: AI might offer a way out, but without a redesigned rhythm of work, companies risk using it to accelerate a broken system.

    We should use the capacity, but we also need to decide what we want it for.

    An AI-generated meeting summary should let some people skip the meeting. A first draft should leave more time to challenge its assumptions, not automatically create demand for three more drafts. Faster research should make room for a better decision about which evidence matters. Automated administrative work should give some time back to the work that still requires expertise.

    None of those outcomes will happen because the tool makes them inevitable. They happen when leaders choose not to consume every minute the tool saves.

    A social contract for focus

    Leaders do not need to redesign the entire organization before they can improve the conditions for deep work. They do need to stop treating concentration as a private preference that employees should defend by themselves.

    Make priorities include the work that will stop

    If a new priority does not remove or shrink anything already on someone’s plate, it is another assignment. Put the existing work next to the new request and decide what stops.

    Turn delegation into a discussion of tradeoffs

    Before assigning new work, ask what the person is currently doing, what accepting the new task would displace, and what help would make the change possible. The question is not simply whether the new request matters. It is whether it matters more than the work it will replace.

    Establish shared rules for access

    Teams need to know what deserves an immediate response, which channels carry urgent requests, when delayed responses are acceptable, and how protected concentration will be communicated. A leader can use personal credibility to make focus socially safe. Employees should not have to appear uncooperative in order to think.

    Design a rhythm between solitude and collaboration

    Do not rely on constant availability to create connection, and do not rely on isolation to create focus. Give people predictable stretches to work independently and purposeful opportunities to compare, question, and reconnect.

    Decide what AI-generated capacity is for

    Do not measure the change only by counting output. Look at whether decisions improve, people learn faster, or the most important work receives more attention. If every efficiency gain creates another commitment, AI has not protected attention. It has increased throughput.

    A useful place to begin is with the question Shawn recommends that leaders ask their teams:

    What is distracting us right now, and what can we do together to win that attention back?

    The work AI cannot do for us

    Individuals still have responsibility for how they use their attention. No organizational policy can make someone care about excellent work. No manager can remove every interruption, and no team can protect unlimited periods of concentration.

    But people cannot productivity-hack their way out of a culture that continually places belonging, responsiveness, and focus in conflict.

    AI is making this conflict harder to ignore. We are able to create more, answer faster, and take on work that once seemed beyond our capacity. None of that tells us which opportunity deserves attention, when a plausible answer needs another hour of thought, or how to protect the relationships that make difficult work worthwhile.

    Those are leadership decisions.

    If a company consumes every minute AI saves, it might become faster while also becoming busier and shallower. Reserving some of the time for judgment, learning, and concentration would be a deliberate choice. It will not happen on its own.

    AI will give many of us more time to think. Whether anyone is allowed to use it that way will depend on the people around them.


    Shawn Vanderhoven and Eric Pratum for The Unfolding Thought Podcast.
    Shawn Vanderhoven with Eric Pratum for The Unfolding Thought Podcast.

    Listen to my full conversation with Shawn Vanderhoven on The Unfolding Thought Podcast.

    Shawn’s book, Pause: How to Lead Brilliant Work in a Busy World, written with Anne Vanderhoven, is available from Amazon and other booksellers.

  • When an Institution Stops Defining Its Own Values

    When an Institution Stops Defining Its Own Values

    An institution does not have to collapse to lose itself. It can keep its name, buildings, leaders, members, and mission statement. It can even become more visible and powerful.

    The loss occurs when its people stop looking to the institution to decide what its own values require. A church can preach forgiveness while a political tribe defines who deserves it. A company can celebrate quality while its incentives teach that speed is what matters. A university can defend inquiry while status rewards only safe conclusions.

    When the stated value conflicts with the system that supplies attention, belonging, reward, and threat, the mission statement is rarely the deciding force.

    That is the leadership problem I kept returning to after my conversation with Jonathan Rauch for The Unfolding Thought Podcast. Rauch’s recent book, Cross Purposes: Christianity’s Broken Bargain with Democracy, is explicitly about Christianity and American democracy. It is also a case study in how an institution can remain recognizable after an outside system has begun defining what its values mean.

    The institution still has formal authority. Something else now has formative authority.

    A lifelong atheist reverses course

    Rauch is not a Christian arguing that Americans should return to church. He is a gay, Jewish atheist who once expected declining religious influence to reduce dogmatism and social conflict.

    In 2003, he wrote approvingly about what he called “apatheism,” a growing indifference toward religion. He expected less religious conviction to produce less dogmatism.

    He now calls that one of the dumbest things he ever wrote.

    The need for identity, meaning, moral certainty, community, and transcendence did not disappear as institutional religion weakened. Rauch believes much of that energy migrated into politics. To understand why that migration is so consequential, we have to distinguish the levels at which religion and politics ordinarily operate.

    Politics is primarily an effort to order the world we inhabit. It concerns laws, institutions, resources, power, and choices whose consequences we can observe, debate, and experience. Religion is concerned first with questions that cannot be settled with certainty through ordinary evidence: why we are here, what ultimately matters, what makes a life good, what we owe one another, and whether reality contains purposes beyond us. Those answers have to be held, at least partly, through faith.

    In that sense, religion sits beneath politics as a foundation, while politics operates above it as an application. “Higher” does not mean more important. It means closer to visible collective action. Our answers to ultimate questions constrain which political goals feel permissible, which compromises feel moral, and which uses of power feel legitimate.

    Religion does not need laws or police power to exert that influence. If a person believes that “thou shalt not kill” expresses an ultimate moral obligation, the belief itself constrains behavior. Families, congregations, and cultures can reinforce the standard long before the state becomes involved. When enough people share such a belief, politics often translates it into law, establishing an expectation that applies even to people who do not share the faith.

    This does not mean every religious rule is good, correct, or worthy of becoming law. It means belief systems shape the boundaries within which politics operates. A legislature can govern a religious institution’s conduct. It cannot make someone believe, and it cannot vote ultimate meaning into existence.

    Religion exerts that influence through story, ritual, repetition, family, community, prohibitions, and ideals. A religious tradition embeds moral meaning beneath conscious argument. It teaches people what feels sacred, shameful, natural, and right, even when they cannot explain every step in the reasoning. That cultural and social learning, accumulated over generations, is difficult to reproduce when the formal belief system is removed.

    When religion weakens, the needs it served remain. For many people, politics begins doing two jobs: ordering common life while also supplying identity, belonging, transcendence, and moral certainty. But politics is a product of the world it is trying to govern. It can make rules, distribute resources, and allocate power. It cannot adequately answer questions about what lies beyond that world.

    Contingent political judgments then begin hardening into articles of faith. Disagreement feels like a battle over reality. Compromise becomes moral surrender. Opponents become enemies of the good rather than citizens with a different judgment.

    Rauch’s reversal is that politics does not simply become more important after religion weakens. It begins filling the role of religion without necessarily possessing the practices longstanding religious traditions developed to restrain fear, pride, vengeance, and tribal certainty. It can inherit religious intensity without inheriting humility, forgiveness, self-examination, and coexistence.

    What remains can still look religious even as politics increasingly supplies its meaning. Rauch’s framework helps explain how.

    In Cross Purposes, Rauch describes three broad forms of Christianity. “Thin” Christianity has become too indistinct to inspire or form people. “Sharp” Christianity replaces spiritual distinctiveness with fear, partisan identity, and political combat. “Thick” Christianity remains demanding and recognizable while developing enough confidence in itself to coexist with people who believe differently.

    Rauch applies that framework to several Christian traditions. He criticizes portions of mainline Christianity for becoming difficult to distinguish from secular progressivism, and portions of white evangelical Christianity for becoming difficult to distinguish from Republican politics. His point is not simply that one party corrupted a church. It is that institutions can import an outside politics from either direction and then mistake that politics for their own mission.

    Do the standards move?

    None of this means a religious institution has been captured whenever its members enter politics, support a party, or vote for a flawed candidate. Politics forces choices among imperfect options. People can make policy tradeoffs without adopting a politician’s character or allowing a party to define their faith.

    A vote is an outcome, not proof of formation. Institutional formation becomes visible when the standards used to interpret the vote begin moving with the coalition. The question is not simply whom people support. It is whether the outside system starts deciding what their own tradition means.

    Support for Donald Trump among white evangelical Protestants illustrates why the distinction matters. In a 2020 Pew Research Center survey, 80 percent said he fought for what they believed in, yet only 15 percent said “morally upstanding” described him very well and just 31 percent liked how he conducted himself apart from his positions. A 2016 study by political scientist Michele Margolis found that white evangelical Republicans who affirmed more core evangelical beliefs were less likely to prefer Trump during the Republican primary but more likely to support him once he became the nominee. Both findings are consistent with political tradeoffs. Neither, by itself, proves institutional capture.

    The more revealing evidence concerns moral standards. In 2011, 30 percent of white evangelical Protestants told the Public Religion Research Institute that an elected official who behaves immorally in private can still behave ethically in public office. In 2016, the figure reached 72 percent. But PRRI’s comparisons over time also show Republicans, white mainline Protestants, white Catholics, and Democrats shifting with political circumstances. The pattern is not unique to one faith or party. People across groups can revise standards around a favored coalition.

    Identity can move with the coalition too. A Pew panel study followed the same respondents from 2016 to 2020. Among white adults who did not initially identify as born-again or evangelical, 16 percent of those expressing a warm view of Trump adopted the evangelical label by 2020, compared with 1 percent of those with consistently cold or neutral views. That does not prove insincerity. It shows political and religious identity moving closely enough together that we should ask which was defining the other.

    That question also complicates what surveys mean by “Christian.” Identity, belief, practice, and participation are not the same. A 2021 study published in Sociological Forum found that Christian nationalism was significantly associated with support for Trump among voters who did not attend religious services, but not among churchgoing voters. The study does not establish that nonattenders are insincere or churchgoers more virtuous. It shows that Christian-nationalist ideas can exert political force even when detached from the institution and practices that might otherwise shape what the identity means.

    This is where Rauch’s distinction between Thin and Thick Christianity becomes especially useful. If we say “Christian” when we mean anyone who accepts the label, we may be combining people formed by regular worship, communal accountability, and demanding moral commitments with people for whom Christianity functions mainly as a cultural or political identity. Christianity can become thinner even while the number of people claiming the identity remains substantial.

    Taken together, these studies do not prove that politics replaced religion. They show what leaders should examine. When moral standards and group labels begin tracking an external alliance, which institution is defining which? My reading of Rauch is that this does not arise from an inherent flaw in Christianity. It arises when people who claim a faith become less bound by its central moral precepts than by political identity. For some people claiming a white evangelical identity, religion can supply the label while politics exerts more force over judgment and behavior. The identity survives after the formative discipline weakens.

    Why the outside system wins

    But why does an outside system gain formative authority in the first place?

    Because the systems competing to form us do not receive equal time or reach us with equal frequency. The institutions and media that occupy most of our time, repeat their interpretations most often, and tie those interpretations to belonging and status will exert the greatest influence. A value heard for an hour or two each week has little chance against a worldview reinforced every day.

    Some of the most important passages in Cross Purposes come from pastors who believed they had lost authority inside their own churches.

    One estimated that a church might have a congregant’s attention for two hours each week while political television had the same person for twelve. Others told Rauch that members arrived already formed by political media and then evaluated sermons, pastors, and other Christians according to that political worldview.

    By the time people arrived at church, they were not waiting for a pastor to explain how to see the world. Many arrived with a political worldview already in place and used it to judge the church.

    Experiments with partisan news support this mechanism. In one randomized experiment, regular Fox News viewers who were paid to watch CNN for a month changed what they knew and considered important on subjects CNN covered. Many of those effects receded after they returned to their normal viewing. Another field experiment found that exposure to partisan news changed consumption and immediate knowledge even when most policy positions and partisan attitudes remained stable.

    Repetition does not instantly erase every prior belief. It decides which facts and interpretations are most available, most familiar, and most likely to frame the next judgment.

    Organizations often behave as though communicating a value is the same thing as forming people around it. Write the value on a wall. Put it in onboarding. Ask the CEO to mention it at the annual meeting. Assume the culture will follow.

    Culture does not work that way.

    Research on organizational climate and culture describes culture as the assumptions and values that guide organizational life, while climate consists of the meanings people attach to their repeated experiences. People learn what matters by watching decisions, exceptions, rewards, punishments, promotions, and the behavior that produces status.

    Steven Kerr made the same point more bluntly in his classic 1975 paper, “On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B”. Organizations routinely say they want one behavior while rewarding another. People notice what actually pays off.

    A company says quality comes first but pays bonuses based only on volume. It gets volume.

    A leadership team says it wants candor but punishes the person who raises an inconvenient concern. It gets silence.

    A business says customers come first but protects a high-performing salesperson who repeatedly harms customer relationships. It teaches everyone that revenue comes first and customers come second.

    Rauch’s pastors describe the same conflict in church life: a church teaches humility, forgiveness, and love of enemies while partisan media can reward certainty, humiliation, fear, and victory. If the second system receives more attention, creates more belonging, and confers more status, repeating the stated values more loudly may have very little effect.

    This is not primarily a communication problem. It is a competition between formative systems.

    The question is not whether people know your values. It is whether following them makes sense inside the system you actually run.

    Leaders can see which system is winning by following attention, reward, threat, and the exceptions made when a stated value becomes costly.

    The goal is not to isolate people from outside influence or give leaders control over private belief. Institutions need outside ideas and criticism, and they do not deserve deference merely because they are institutions. The danger is unrecognized capture. The test is whether an institution’s actual decisions give members a coherent basis for evaluating the competing systems trying to shape them.

    When an institution wants to know which system is actually forming its members, it should look at the moments when following its stated values imposes a cost. That is where the ability to lose becomes decisive.

    Why the ability to lose matters

    Politics becomes especially dangerous when it begins doing the work of religion. In ordinary democratic politics, elections are part of an ebb and flow of shared power. One coalition governs for a time. Another loses, remains legitimate, and has a chance to persuade voters and govern later. Defeat can be consequential without becoming an answer to ultimate questions.

    Once politics is asked to supply identity, meaning, transcendence, and moral certainty, an election no longer feels like a temporary decision about who governs. It feels like a battle for the country’s soul. If one side represents salvation and the other evil, perhaps even Jesus and Satan, accepting defeat does not feel like restraint or power sharing. It feels like allowing evil to triumph.

    The structure is the same regardless of which party casts itself as the defender of good. Opponents stop being citizens who judge policies differently and become evidence of corruption. Political affiliation becomes a proxy for moral worth. Friendship across political lines gets harder because the disagreement appears to reach all the way down to what kind of person someone is.

    Values are easiest to honor when they cost nothing. The revealing moment comes when honesty threatens the sale, quality threatens the schedule, fairness threatens an ally, or restraint threatens a political victory. If the same value repeatedly disappears under pressure, the organization may not have a value. It may have a preference that survives only when the surrounding system permits it.

    If losing means annihilation, domination begins to look like self-defense.

    Political scientists use the phrase “losers’ consent” to describe the willingness of people who lose an election to continue accepting the legitimacy of the democratic system. It is not an instruction to accept a fraudulent or unfair result. Research suggests that consent is sustainable when the route back to power remains genuinely open. James Fearon’s model of self-enforcing democracy makes that logic explicit; studies have found that alternations of power can narrow the legitimacy gap between winners and losers and that people are more likely to accept outcomes when elections are free and fair. This also places obligations on winners. Research on mutual forbearance describes why democratic competitors sometimes refrain from exploiting every legal advantage when doing so would make future competition less credible. Repeated losses can reduce trust, while affective polarization can deepen the divide between winners and losers. Across these findings, the practical requirement is the same: procedures must be fair and the possibility of participating meaningfully tomorrow must remain believable.

    The same principle applies inside an organization. People can accept a rejected proposal, a missed promotion, or a strategic decision they opposed if they believe the process was fair, dissent has not destroyed their future, and the next decision has not already been rigged against them. Healthy institutions do not prevent people from losing. They preserve a path by which people can lose, remain legitimate participants, and try again.

    Rauch argues that the Christian teachings he summarizes as “do not be afraid,” respect the equal dignity of every person, and forgive rather than destroy opponents can help make political loss survivable. A reader does not need to accept the theology to see the institutional function. Groups that can tolerate uncertainty, preserve the standing of dissenters, and remain bound by their commitments when they lose are less likely to treat every decision as an existential war.

    A tradition that teaches people how to lose without abandoning conviction can keep politics from becoming a religion. When that formative work weakens, politics absorbs religious intensity and every contest begins to feel ultimate.

    Conviction without domination

    Can an institution retain strong convictions, accept limits on its power, and coexist with people who reject its beliefs?

    Rauch’s constructive counterexample comes from the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and its negotiations with LGBTQ advocates.

    In 2015, church representatives, Republican and Democratic legislators, Equality Utah, the ACLU of Utah, and other faith communities supported Utah Senate Bill 296. It extended employment and housing protections to LGBTQ Utahns while defining protections for religious institutions. The participants did not resolve their disagreement about marriage or sexuality. They identified protections they could enact together while continuing to disagree. The compromise was not a universal template: it omitted public-accommodations protections, and the ACLU criticized its unusually broad exemptions.

    The relationships built through that process supported later collaboration. Rauch treats the federal Respect for Marriage Act as another application of the same approach: protect same-sex marriages while preserving specified religious-liberty protections. Both the ACLU and the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops argued that important protections remained incomplete, though for different reasons. Compromise did not require anyone to pretend the disagreement was unimportant.

    Rauch connects the church’s approach to its theology of moral agency. His interpretation is that protecting another person’s meaningful ability to choose can be a religious obligation even when the person makes a choice the church considers wrong. That gives compromise a foundation inside the institution’s own identity instead of treating it as reluctant surrender to secular pressure.

    Compromise is not automatically virtuous. Some proposed compromises preserve injustice, ask only the vulnerable party to concede, or weaken rights that should not depend on negotiation. The example supports something narrower and more useful:

    An institution can maintain a strong identity without trying to dominate everyone outside it.

    Confidence in an identity may make negotiation easier. A brittle institution experiences disagreement as erasure. A more secure institution can distinguish changing a law, losing a vote, or accommodating a neighbor from surrendering its reason for existing. The pattern leaders should look for is not weak identity, but strong identity capable of surviving constraint, disagreement, compromise, and loss.

    What leaders should examine

    The leadership lesson from Rauch’s case is not that organizations should become less political, more religious, or more ideologically neutral. Organizations have different purposes. A civil-rights group should advocate. A church should teach a faith. A political party should seek political power. A business should make choices about customers, employees, investment, and risk.

    Every institution should understand what is actually shaping its members’ judgment about the mission.

    Leaders can begin with five questions.

    1. Who receives enough attention to define reality?

      Your annual values presentation is competing with compensation plans, customer demands, professional networks, social media, managers, coworkers, and daily experience. Which source has enough repetition and credibility to define what people believe is really happening?


    2. What behavior produces status and reward?

      Ignore what the organization says it celebrates. Who gets promoted, protected, invited into important meetings, forgiven for mistakes, and trusted with resources? Those decisions teach the culture what success means.


    3. Which commitments disappear under pressure?

      Every institution makes exceptions. Look for the direction of the exceptions. If quality is always sacrificed to speed, candor to harmony, or fairness to a high performer’s results, the exception may be the operating value.


    4. Can someone disagree and still belong?

      Strong cultures need boundaries. They also need a way to distinguish disagreement from betrayal. When every dissenting idea becomes evidence that someone is not truly part of the group, leaders lose access to corrective information and members learn to conceal what they see.


    5. Can the institution lose without abandoning itself?

      Can a leader lose an argument and continue supporting the team? Can a business lose an account without breaking its standards? Can a movement lose a fair vote and continue using legitimate procedures to contest the next one? Commitments that survive loss are more credible than commitments that appear only in victory speeches.


    These questions do not prevent outside influence. They make the influence visible enough to evaluate.

    The mission statement can survive after the mission is gone

    It would be easy to dismiss Cross Purposes as an argument about Trump, white evangelicals, or the proper relationship between Christianity and democracy if you have not read it.

    Rauch is examining what happens when an institution no longer gives its members a strong enough account of its own purpose to resist being redefined by another system.

    The sequence matters. As the institution’s formative force weakens, another system begins defining reality for its members. Its standards start moving with that outside system. Loss begins to feel existential, domination becomes defensible, and obedience to the outside system is mistaken for fidelity to the mission.

    That can happen from the political right or left. It can happen through donors, customers, algorithms, compensation plans, professional status, or fear. It can happen without anyone consciously deciding that the mission should change.

    By the time leaders notice, the institution may still look much as it always did. The name remains. The meetings continue. The values are repeated. The organization may even be winning.

    The test is not whether members can recite the institution’s values. It is whether those values still govern when another system offers more belonging, status, power, or protection from loss.

    An institution does not lose itself only when it changes its mission statement. It can lose itself while repeating the statement more loudly than ever.

    Jonathan Rauch and Eric Pratum during their conversation on The Unfolding Thought Podcast
    Jonathan Rauch and Eric Pratum on The Unfolding Thought Podcast.

    This essay draws on my conversation with Jonathan Rauch for The Unfolding Thought Podcast and his book, Cross Purposes: Christianity’s Broken Bargain with Democracy.